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ABSTRACT
Information hiding ensures privacy by transforming person-
alized data so that certain sensitive information cannot be
inferred any more. One state-of-the-art information-hiding
approach is the Pufferfish framework. It lets the users spec-
ify their privacy requirements as so-called discriminative pairs
of secrets, and it perturbs data so that an adversary does
not learn about the probability distribution of such pairs.
However, deploying the framework on complex data requires
application-specific work. This includes a general definition
of the representation of secrets in the data. Another issue
is that the tradeoff between Pufferfish privacy and utility of
the data is largely unexplored in quantitative terms. In this
study, we quantify this tradeoff for smart meter data. Such
data contains fine-grained time series of power-consumption
data from private households. Disseminating such data in an
uncontrolled way puts privacy at risk. We investigate how
time series of energy consumption data must be transformed
to facilitate specifying secrets that Pufferfish can use.We
ensure the generality of our study by looking at different
information-extraction approaches, such as re-identification
and non-intrusive-appliance-load monitoring, in combina-
tion with a comprehensive set of secrets. Additionally, we
provide quantitative utility results for a real-world applica-
tion, the so-called local energy market.
1. INTRODUCTION
Designing a smart grid electricity-supply infrastructure is
an important issue. This is because it promises to reduce
CO2 emissions and to guarantee supply at affordable prices.
The smart grid initiative requires the installation of smart
meters in private households. These devices measure the
power consumption in short time intervals, e.g., every 15
minutes. Thus, they produce time series that contain the
sum of the energy consumption of all electrical devices ac-
tive during such a time interval. Various applications require
access to the this data. Think of demand-side management
or local energy markets [7], an efficient way of allocating re-
newable energy. They require access to the entire time series.
Legal obligations like the EUC 543/2013 even mandate the
publication of market data. However, privacy regulations
and privacy preferences of individuals are in the way of ar-
bitrary parties accessing such data. Obligations such as the
European Directive 95/46/EC only allow the disclosure of
data only if it is non-personalized, or if the individuals have
consented.
Smart-meter data contains a lot of personal information [24,
3, 15, 6]. This includes information on devices running and
on the presence of residents. In consequence, any smart grid
service must consider the antagonism between the disclosure
of personal data and the privacy of individuals. Which in-
formation actually is considered private depends on the indi-
vidual. Thus, processing time series while protecting privacy
requires privacy constraints that one can define individually.
Libraries of constraints one can resort to are conceivable as
well. The information to be hidden is referred to as se-
crets. Potential secrets go well beyond aggregated values
from several households approaches such as [2] have exclu-
sively focused on so far. De-personalization of such data
(‘anonymization’) is not applicable in many cases either:
Work on re-identification [6] shows that it is very difficult
to remove all relationships to individuals from smart-meter
data while preserving utility. Furthermore, use cases such as
demand-side management do require data with identifiers.
Example 1: Bob has a smart meter and is willing to
accept the disclosure of his data if it does not contain cer-
tain information. Suppose that Bob has a flow heater which
starts when he begins showering, stops when he finishes and
does not consume power otherwise. This heater will be our
running example. Bob wants to keep the exact time private
when he is showering on weekends and in the morning dur-
ing weekdays. This defines the secrets. An adversary should
not be able to learn whether the flow heater is starting or
stopping between 8:00 and 11:00 on a weekday by inspect-
ing the disclosed data. On weekends, the data should be
so noisy that inferring the time when the heater is work-
ing is unlikely. To this end, one has to know how the time
series reflect the heater usage and hide this on a weekday
and detect when the heater starts and stops on a weekend.
Approaches such as applying differential privacy on smart
meter data [2] do not help with this kind of secret. Finally,
to preserve utility the data should still contain information
that Bob does not explicitly want to hide. 
Individuals might allow the disclosure of their smart-meter
data if their privacy preferences are strictly respected. Each
individual should have the option to specify such private
information. The Pufferfish privacy framework [20] guar-
antees that certain sensitive information is removed from a
data set. Pufferfish supports the definition of intuitively un-
derstandable privacy requirements and their semantics. It
also covers correlations within the data set, which is some-
times necessary to guarantee privacy while keeping utility.
Differential privacy in turn leaves aside such correlations.
Example 2 (Correlations in the data): Let f(A), f(B), f(C)
be smart-meter time series of Alice, Bob and Carl’s house-
hold. f(B)[t] is the total power consumption of Bob’s house-
hold at time slot t. Differential privacy approaches [2, 29]
publish the privacy-enhanced sum at each time slot of the
households considered, i.e., f(B)[t]+f(A)[t]+f(C)[t]+ . . . :
If there is not any correlation of the consumptions of Bob,
Alice and Carl, an adversary cannot infer the actual con-
sumption of one of them. However, there also are correla-
tions when looking at each time series in isolation: Suppose
that Alice, Bob and Carl each have a flow heater (for the
shower) and bath lighting. f(B)1[t] is Bob’s flow heater con-
sumption and f(B)2[t] the one of the bath lighting. f(B)[t]
is the sum of all appliances in Bob’s household: f(B)[t] =
f(B)1[t] + f(B)2[t] + . . . . Privacy cannot be guaranteed in
the same way as for the sum of f(B)[t], f(A)[t] and f(C)[t]:
The flow heater and the bath lighting obviously have cor-
relations Differential Privacy does not deal with [19]. 
Pufferfish is an abstract framework that, regarding smart-
meter data, (i) requires challenging conceptual work and (ii)
has not been evaluated quantitatively. The challenges are to
represent private information in smart-meter data, to per-
turb the aggregated data according to Pufferfish guarantees,
to ensure generality and to evaluate utility and coverage of
privacy requirements. Regarding (ii), we examine the trade-
off between privacy and utility in the scenario in particular.
Representation of Private Information. Each time a spe-
cific device runs, this results in a sequence of power-con-
sumption values added to the total consumption. Such se-
quences corresponding to runs of the same device may vary
in the actual values. This is because (a) appliances have
a slightly different power consumption each time they run,
and (b) the smart meter may measure their consumption
together with the ones of other devices. A first challenge
not covered by currently existing approaches is to find an
abstracted representation of time series flexible enough to
cover this uncertainty and specific enough to have a mean-
ing for the secret in question. We call a single value of such
an abstracted representation coefficient. This abstraction
must have a clear-cut semantics, and the transformation of
the time series to this representation must be well-defined.
The goal of the abstraction is to have coefficients with a
meaning allowing to formulate specific secrets: One should
choose transformations whose results correspond to poten-
tial secrets.
Example 3 (Flow heater, abstraction and coefficients): In
Example 1 the coefficients have to allow conclusions regard-
ing the heater. Suppose that a heater consumes 25kW when
running and 0W otherwise. Thus, a difference of the power
consumption at point of time t to t + 1 of around 25kW
possibly indicates a starting flow heater. Exactly this can
be subject of a privacy requirement. A meaningful abstrac-
tion then has a coefficient representing this kind of change.
While the start of the flow heater results in two successive
consumption values, other devices will create more complex
sequences. For example, a washing machine carries out dif-
ferent tasks like heating or spinning. Such information must
be hidden if it is relevant for someone’s privacy. 
Perturbing Smart-Meter Data. Pufferfish requires to adapt
the data that represents a secret. This is not straightfor-
ward, because provable privacy guarantees require pertur-
bations that fulfill the Pufferfish requirements [20]. In par-
ticular, perturbing an aggregate of several appliances is not
obvious, since it requires a decomposition on a conceptual
level. Next, we must take into account that different ap-
pliances in the decomposed representation may have cor-
relations. Our objective is to deal with such time series
individually per appliance.
Generality. It is challenging to find a suitable abstracted
representation of the secrets so that the semantics of the rep-
resentation (a) covers a wide range of privacy requirements
for smart meter data and (b) allows Pufferfish to prove com-
pliance with these requirements.
Evaluation. Quantifying the usefulness of the perturbed
smart meter data is not obvious: General abstract distance
measures for time series do not necessarily quantify utility.
Example 4 (Abstract Distance measures): Suppose that a
time series is perturbed two times. Further, with the second
perturbation, the Euclidean distance of the resulting series
to the original one is twice as large as the first one. This
does not mean that utility is halved. For example, it may
still be possible to identify outliers in time series. 
Next, the evaluation of utility requires meaningful user-
defined privacy requirements. Finding realistic requirements
is challenging since many individuals are not yet aware of the
privacy risks of the smart grid. Thus, an objective source of
requirements is needed for a meaningful evaluation.
Contributions. We address all these challenges as fol-
lows: Since the kinds of possible secrets are broad, we care-
fully select different abstracted representations together with
adequate transformations for each of them. We illustrate
this using the wavelet transformation as example; it covers
several kinds of possible secrets. Privacy is guaranteed by
the decomposition of the aggregated power signal into sev-
eral channels on a conceptual level and the application of
noise following the -Pufferfish principle [20] . Before publi-
cation, a time series is transformed back to the time-based
representation. Thus, the published privacy-enhanced and
the original time series have the same format.
In our evaluation, we show that this transformation princi-
ple is general enough to cover a wide range of requirements.
We arrive at objective privacy requirements by looking at
the outcome of various information-extraction methods from
literature, i.e., features of smart metering data that others
have deemed relevant. In particular, we define secrets cover-
ing a re-identification [6] and a non-intrusive-appliance-load
monitoring [4] approach. Next, in a local energy market [7],
the utility of participants depends on the accuracy of the
description of their demand; using perturbed data instead
of the real one is expected to curb utility. Here, utility not
only is an objective measure, it also has the nice characteris-
tic that it can be quantified as welfare, an established notion
from economics. The impact of privacy guarantees on utility
is relatively low, while hiding realistic secrets. In numbers,
even with severe secrets that require to modify the entire
time series, the welfare in that energy market is reduced by
26% only.
Paper outline: We start with related work (Section 2)
and then introduce our way of applying Pufferfish (Sec-
tion 3). We analyze of different transformations (Section 4)
and evaluate our approach (Section 5). Section 6 concludes.
– There exists an extended version of this article, contain-
ing a more detailed description of Pufferfish and the wavelet
transformation, proofs of the lemmas and material that com-
plements the evaluation [18].
2. FUNDAMENTALS
Having defined a common notation in Section 2.1, we re-
view well-known privacy-protection approaches in Section 2.2.
The Pufferfish Framework is explained in Section 2.3. The
wavelet transformation (Section 2.4) is a technique to pro-
cess and analyze time series, which we use as well. Other
related work in turn is discussed in Section 5.
2.1 Notation
In order to support different abstract representations of
time series, we have chosen a vector-based representation.
Vectors are elements of a vector space. The coefficients of
each vector defined on a basis express a finite linear combina-
tion of this basis. In other words, the basis defines the mean-
ing of the coefficients. Vectors also allow to change the basis,
resulting in other meanings of the coefficients. The standard
representation of a time series is a mapping between points
of time and the value domain, e.g., consumption values mea-
sured. Thus we need to define the time domain T first and
then define a time series as a vector.
Definition 1 (Time domain T ): T is the standard do-
main of the time series considered. We assume that it is
discrete and of finite length, i.e., ‖T ‖ ≤ ∞. 
Definition 2 (Time series): A time series is an n-
dimensional vector with the basis B, referred to as fB . To
refer to its t-th element, we write: fB [t]. 
In this work, we refer to time series as vectors, using com-
mon vector notation. This requires a definition of a stan-
dard basis consisting of canonical unit vectors ei. For a
given T , we define the relationship of a time series f to each
t ∈ T : Let [t1, ..., tn] be the ordered list of all ti ∈ T . Then
fB [ti] = f
>
B · ei is the electricity consumption at time slot
ti. In other words, ei represents the ith ordered element of
T , and B = {ei|i = 1 . . . n} forms the standard basis.
Definition 3 (Vector space): VB is the vector space
containing all linear combinations of basis B. 
2.2 Privacy-Protection Approaches
Next to Pufferfish, which serves as the framework for this
current work and is described in Section 2.3, there is further
related work. Differential Privacy provides provable privacy
guarantees for statistical databases [13] and has been applied
to smart meter data [2] and time series [29]. Example 2
has illustrated the limitations. Other approaches for time
series disclose only aggregated results [5, 31] or build on
k-anonymity [1, 25]. In contrast to such approaches, we
are not limited to one specific information-extraction goal.
Pufferfish features a more general approach, namely hiding
user-defined secrets. Additionally, [5, 31, 1, 25] do not give
provable guarantees. The approach evaluated here in turn
allows for arbitrary queries over the disclosed data.
There exist privacy approaches applicable to time series
built on k-anonymity [1, 25], with its known limitations. The
intuition is that an individual is indistinguishable amongst
k − 1 others. Usually k time series are generalized to a
common representation. However, k-anonymity based ap-
proaches do not allow for individual preferences. Further,
such approaches remove identifiers, making the data useless
for applications dependent on these.
A perturbation method which handles each individual time
series in isolation is to add random noise. However, there
exist several methods to de-noise time series and to recover
the original values, see [26]. As a counter-measure to de-
noising techniques, the perturbation scheme in [26] transfers
the time series to a Fourier or wavelet representation and
then adds noise to coefficients exceeding a threshold. How-
ever, a data owner cannot decide what exactly is perturbed.
This may result in unnecessarily perturbed information and
in sensitive information still present.
Another approach for protecting privacy in smart-meter
data is to install batteries and to introduce privacy-aware
power routing strategies [23, 17]. However, this requires in-
stallation of additional hardware, and privacy requirements
may not exceed battery capacities. [28] explicitly considers
the privacy-utility tradeoff for smart-meter data, but with-
out formal guarantees.
2.3 The -Pufferfish Framework
Pufferfish [20] is a generalization of Differential Privacy
providing provable privacy guarantees and utility [19]. Puffer-
fish requires the definition of the following constituents: (a)
A set of potential secrets S. S describes which information
can be hidden. It is a domain for Spairs. (b) The discrimina-
tive pairs of secrets Spairs, describe how a piece of informa-
tion should be hidden. (c) Pufferfish requires data-evolution
scenarios D.
Pufferfish privacy means hiding specified secrets S. Ex-
amples for the relational data model are: ‘Bob has cancer.’
or, on another abstraction level, ‘The record of individual i
is in the data.’. In general, secrets are facts an individual
wants to hide. Spairs is a subset of S × S. Pairs of secrets
specify what an adversary should not be able to distinguish.
For example, an individual does not want an adversary to
know whether she has cancer or not, so the correspond-
ing pair would be (‘Alice has cancer.’,‘¬ Alice has cancer.’).
The framework features privacy guarantees for discrimina-
tive pairs (si, sj). This is advantageous, as it requires less
noise to hide the specific kind of cancer Alice has, compared
to hiding whether she has cancer at all. Discriminative pairs
have to be mutually exclusive, i.e., at most one is true, but
not necessarily exhaustive, i.e., both can be false.
Data-evolution scenarios contain assumptions on how the
data has been generated. This is background knowledge of
an adversary. It quantifies how likely a fact is. For example,
if a data set is from a cancer center, the probability that
a patient has cancer is higher than for a normal hospital.
Technically speaking, D is a set of probability distributions
over the possible database instances I. Each d ∈ D cor-
responds to the background knowledge of an attacker on
how the data has been generated. For example, P (Data =
{x1, ..., xn} |dp) = p(x1) · ... ·p(xn) if the probabilities of each
record in I are independent. P (Data = {x1, ..., xn} |dp)
is the conditional probability that Data is {x1, ..., xn} un-
der dp.
A privacy mechanism M is a method for transferring a
data set Data into a perturbed and privacy-enhanced repre-
sentation M(Data). It guarantees the -Pufferfish privacy
criterion if it fulfills the following definition:
Definition 4 (-Pufferfish Privacy): Given a set of se-
crets SP , a set of discriminative pairs SPpairs, data-evolution
scenarios D and a privacy parameter  > 0, a privacy mecha-
nism M satisfies -Pufferfish(S,Spairs,D)-Privacy if, for all
outputs ofM, all pairs (si, sj) ∈ Spairs and all distributions
d ∈ D the following holds:
P (M(Data) = o|si, d) ≤ e · P (M(Data) = o|sj , d)
P (M(Data) = o|sj , d) ≤ e · P (M(Data) = o|si, d)
P (M(Data) = o|sj , d) is the probability that the output of
M is o if sj holds, and the data distribution is d. 
The intuition is best explained with the following equation
that is directly computed from Definition 4:
e− ≤ P (si|M(Data) = o, d)
P (sj |M(Data) = o, d)/
P (si|d)
P (sj |d) ≤ e

If an adversary thinks that si is α times as likely as sj , then,
after having access to the privacy enhanced output of M,
he may only believe that si is at most e
α times and at
least e−α as likely as sj . The framework itself only spec-
ifies the privacy guarantees and does not require a specific
perturbation method, as long as the guarantees are fulfilled.
2.4 Wavelet Transformation
We use the wavelet-transformed representation as an ex-
ample, in order to express secrets and to hide them. The
following is a concise review, see for instance [27] for a com-
prehensive introduction. Note that our study is not limited
to the wavelet transformation, see Section 4.
Definition 5 (Wavelet): A wavelet w[t] is a finite time
series with properties:
∫ +∞
−∞ w[t] = 0 and
∫ +∞
−∞ w[t]
2 = 1. 
Definition 6 (Wavelet Transformation): A wavelet
transformation is an orthonormal basis transform to a wavelet
basis. Each element of the wavelet basis is a development
over time. 
To cover the whole n-dimensional vector space, the wavelet
transform results in multiple levels, reflecting different hori-
zontally stretched representations of w[t]. Further, the wavelet
transformation is invertible. The coefficient at the highest
level, the scaling coefficient, is not a multiple of the wavelet
w[t]; it represents the absolute y-position of the time series.
Figure 1 contains a graphical representation of the Haar
wavelet used in the paper. Its form indicates, that a time
series in Haar Basis always results in coefficients reflecting
‘changes’ between consecutive points of time. Definition 5
holds since the area under the curve and the one above are
of equal size. Wavelet transformation constructs a basis
consisting of orthonormal basis vectors of time shifted and
stretched wavelets. The Haar wavelet basis contains for in-
stance a vector represented by Figure 1 in the time domain.
If we transform f to a basis consisting of (Haar) wavelets fw,
each element fw[x] represents the change between neighbor-
ing values in the time domain. Generally speaking, fw now
represents the pattern of Figure 1. This intuitive explana-
tion leaves aside that a wavelet as is does not cover the entire
vector space since it is considered to be ‘short’. However,
this is necessary to provide invertibility. To do so, a wavelet
transformation results in multiple levels. This leads to a
’horizontally stretched’ version of the Haar wavelet. The
number of levels depends on the dimensionality/length of
the time series.
The first level always represents the wavelet as is. The
higher the level, the more ’horizontally stretched’ the wavelet
becomes. In the second level, a representation with Haar
-1.0
-0.5
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Figure 1: Haar Wavelet
basis represents the change between f [t], f [t+ 1] and f [t+
2], f [t + 3], etc. The last level is responsible for the abso-
lute level of the time series and does not correspond to any
change. From a signal processing perspective, lower levels
contain the high frequencies and higher levels lower ones.
Further, the wavelet-transformed coefficients always corre-
spond to a fixed number of time-based coefficients. Thus
the transformation keeps their time location.
Note that, to ease presentation, we include all the nec-
essary information for the transformation in w. In our ex-
ample, w contains the Haar wavelet w[t] together with the
transformation. An example Haar wavelet transform of the
time series on Figure 4 is displayed in Figure 5. A value
smaller than zero corresponds to an increasing power con-
sumption. Depending on the position of the increase, the
change influences the first or the second level.
Discriminative Pair: 
(‚Flow heater is starting‘, 
‚Flow heater is NOT starting‘)
Meaning of wavelet coefficient: ,Flow heater…‘
Level 1 0 2000
‚... does not start‘ ‚...is starting‘
Level 2
Level ...
0 1500
‚…does not start‘ ‚…is starting'
Wavelet Basis
Figure 2: Example: Meaning of wavelet coefficients
Using wavelets requires specifying which elements in fw
are relevant for the individual: Switching on the flow heater
(when Bob starts showering) results in a strong sudden in-
crease of the power consumption. In the Haar wavelet do-
main this leads to high coefficients on lower levels. When
the flow heater is switched off, this has an analogous effect
on the coefficients. This allows the distinction whether Bob
starts/stops to shower or not, cf. Figure 2.
3. PROVABLE PRIVACY
FOR SMART METER TIME-SERIES
We now explain our instantiation of the Pufferfish mech-
anism M for smart-meter data. M(f) reconstructs a time
series f into one that guarantees -Pufferfish privacy. We
conduct the steps listed in Figure 3. To ease presentation,
we assume a single pair of discriminative secrets spair and a
single time series f in what follows. This is not a restriction
Input: time series f
Input: Set of discriminative pairs Spairs of secrets S,
(Inverse) Transformation Mechanism CtransB′ ,
ICB′ and basis B′
Input: Data evolution scenarios D
Input: Privacy parameter 
Result: Time series with privacy guarantees f ′
foreach spair ∈ Spairs do
// Step 1: Transformation;
fB′ = CtransB′ (f);
// Step 2: Perturbation;
Determine N to fulfill -Pufferfish Privacy based on
D and spair;
Set pcoeff according to spair;
f ′B′ = P(fB′ ,N, pcoeff );
// Step 3: Inverse Transformation;
f ′ = ICB′(f ′B′)
end
return f ′;
Algorithm 1: Pufferfish Privacy Mechanism M for
Smart-Meter Data
Step 1:
Transfor-
mation
time-series f
discriminative
pair spair
abstracted representation fw
Step 2: Perturbation
Time series with privacy guarantees f ′w
Step 3: Inverse Transformation
Privacy enhanced time series f ′
Figure 3: Privacy preservation for spair
since each element of Spairs is handled in isolation for each
time series. Consequently, when speaking of an aggregate,
we always mean f [t], the aggregate consumption of all run-
ning appliances. For further explanations see Algorithm 1.
It contains the pseudo-code including the necessary param-
eters. We now explain the loop body of Algorithm 1.
Step 1. We transform a time series f to an abstracted
representation fw. Reconsider Example 3. The start of a
flow heater requires two consecutive values in the time-based
representation. In the Haar transform output in turn, one
coefficient is enough to represent this. See Section 3.1.
Step 2. In the transformed representation, secrets deter-
mine the perturbation of the abstracted time series accord-
ing to Pufferfish guarantees. See Section 3.2.
Step 3. We transform the modified time series back to a
time based representation f ′, see Section 3.3.
3.1 Step 1: Transformation
This step transforms a given time series to an abstracted
representation where each value carries a specific meaning in
relation to secrets (and not necessarily to a point of time).
Secrets are geared to specific transformations. Thus we
first need to define the transformation mechanisms (Sec-
tion 3.1.1), before formulating secrets respectively discrimi-
native pairs for smart meter data (Section 3.1.2).
3.1.1 Transformation Mechanism
Representations of time series in an abstracted manner
are numerous [11]. The right choice depends on the privacy
requirements. Thus, we define requirements on transforma-
tion approaches to be applicable with our approach.
Definition 7 (Transformation Mechanism): Let B
be the standard basis and B′ a different basis of a vector
space. A transformation mechanism CB′ is a function of
type VB → VB′ that converts a time series from the time-
based representation f to an abstracted representation fB′
with basis B′ and fulfills the following properties:
1. The transformation is invertible, i.e., there exists an
inverse of CB′ We refer to it as ICB′ : VB′ → VB .
2. CB′ is an endomorphism for the +-operator. Let f, g
be time series, then: CB′(f + g) = CB′(f) + CB′(g)

Suppose that the time series is an aggregate of power con-
sumptions. The endomorphism property simplifies the per-
turbation: Noise can be added to certain parts of the aggre-
gate as well as to the aggregate, yielding the same result.
Section 3.1.2 explains the importance of this property.
The invertibility property implies the following: First, if
fB′ is invertible, any information of f is present in fB′ .
Thus, any information of f is also included in the abstracted
representation. Second, invertibility requires well-defined se-
mantics of every element in fB′ . Consequently, such clear
semantics also hold for secrets dependent on the coefficients,
i.e., each coefficient has a specific meaning in relation to a se-
cret. Note that we do not make any restriction on the length
of fB′ in comparison to f ; so the transformation output may
also have a higher dimensionality than f .
Haar-Wavelet example transformation. The wavelet
transformation as described in Section 2.4 satisfies Defini-
tion 7. This transformation for the Haar basis is invertible
and an endomorphism for addition. See Lemma 1. Addi-
tionally, the wavelet transformation keeps the time location;
each value in fB′ [x] corresponds to a specific number of en-
tries in f [t]. We refer to the wavelet-transformation mecha-
nism with the Haar basis as CWaveh .
Lemma 1: The Haar wavelet transformation is invertible
and an endomorphism for the +-operator
Proof: There exists an orthonormal basis for the haar
wavelet transformation [12] for any vector with 2n coeffi-
cients. The orthonormal basis vector form a basis transfor-
mation matrix H, and the following holds:
f ·H = fh
This operation is invertible since for each matrix consisting
of orthonormal vectors an inverse H ′ such that H ·H ′ = I
exists:
fh ·H ′ = f ·H ·H ′ = f · I
Additionally, matrix vector multiplication is distributive:
f ·H = (f1 + · · ·+ f i) ·H = f1 ·H + · · ·+ f i ·H
Thus, the Haar wavelet transformation is also a +-endomor-
phism. 
3.1.2 Secrets in Smart-Meter Data
Possible secrets S an individual may want to hide range
from relatively simple ones like ‘The dishwasher is running’
to rather complex ones involving several appliances like ‘There
is cooking activity’. Other examples are ‘There is activity in
the kitchen’, ‘The fridge is running’ or ‘Someone is watching
a certain TV program in the morning’.
The power-consumption data of a household, usually mon-
itored by a smart meter installed at the main power connec-
tion, is the aggregate of all appliances. However, only parts
of it typically are relevant for certain secrets. Hence, it is
important to be able to examine parts of the aggregate in
isolation. Looking at the smart meter time series as a sig-
nal, it is the aggregate of several channels. For example,
the consumption of the television is one channel f1[t], the
dishwasher is another one, f2[t].
Definition 8 (Signals and channels): A signal is the
complete power consumption measured at the smart me-
ter of the household and is represented as a vector f [t]. A
channel is a part of the signal, referred to with a super-
script, e.g., f i[t]. We see a signal as the sum of n channels:
f [t] = f1[t] + · · ·+ fn[t] 
Even on channels only containing the consumption of in-
dividual devices, a sequence of consumption values is still
required in many cases to gain interesting information. From
non-intrusive appliance load monitoring (NIALM)
approaches [15, 22, 21, 14, 4] it is well-known that a sequence
of time-value pairs identifies appliances and their state, and
appliances tend to be detectable in f .
The connection between values of a time series (even if
it is an abstraction) and intuitive descriptions of possible
secrets is not obvious. Thus, we define the following.
Definition 9 (Description of a Secret): A description
of a secret is a triple
s = (sBase, sTrans, sCoeff )
where sBase is the basis for a transformation mechanism
sTrans. sCoeff is the formal description of the coefficients
in the abstracted representation fsBase that make s true.
We write fw[t] ∈ sCoeff if an element of the transformed
time series makes the secret true. 
We do not require a specific language to describe the coef-
ficients. However, the description has to be non-ambiguous.
A description of a secret reflects what should be hidden,
but not how. It rather is necessary to have discriminative
pairs of secrets. Thus, Pufferfish requires a description of
discriminative pairs of secrets on smart-meter time series.
Definition 10 (Description of a Discriminative Pair
of Secrets): A description of a discriminative pair of se-
crets spair is a pair of descriptions of secrets spair = (s1, s2),
so that the following holds:
• The base as well as the transformation method are the
same (sBase1 = s
Base
2 and s
Trans
1 = s
Trans
2 ).
• The secrets are mutually exclusive but do not need to
be exhaustive, i.e., there may exist values in the range
of a coefficient that neither make s1 nor s2 true.
• The coefficients in question for s1 and for s2 are non-
overlapping: sCoeff1 ∩ sCoeff2 = ∅.

Typically, only parts of the entire signals are relevant for
secrets and discriminative pairs.
Definition 11 (Relevant Channel): For a given signal
f consisting of i ∈ [1 . . . n] channels and for a discriminative
pair spair = (s1, s2), we call the channel that contains the
information whether s1 or s2 is true the relevant channel
r. We refer to the corresponding time series as fr. The
decomposition partitions the signal. Formally:
f [t] = f1[t] + · · ·+ fr[t] + · · ·+ fn[t]

There typically are correlations between channels. They
depend on the actual discriminative pair and the assump-
tions contained in D regarding an adversary. In Example 2,
the lighting f2 is correlated with the heater f1. But the
lighting consumption is not part of the relevant channel,
since it is not directly related to the showering activity.
Correlations result in different data-evolution scenarios
and require a different distribution of the noise applied. The
specifics are part of the Pufferfish Framework [20].The fol-
lowing example illustrates the description of the secrets in
smart-meter time series.
Example 5 (Instantiations of Secrets for the Heater): Bob
wants to hide whether secret s1 ‘The heater is starting/stopp-
ing’ or secret s2 ‘The heater is not starting/stopping’ is true.
The wavelet transform with the Haar basis reflects ‘switch
on’ respectively ‘switch off’ events and is suitable for the
discriminative pair spair = (s1, s2). Let h be the Haar
wavelet basis, then sTrans1 = s
Trans
2 = CWaveh . For the sake
of simplicity, we assume that the heater power-consumption
function is of rectangular shape over time, as illustrated in
Figure 4 (generated with the model of [30]). Figure 5 con-
tains CWaveh (f) of the time series illustrated in Figure 4:
The x-axis in Figure 5 shows the time location and the y-
axis the ‘intensity’ of the Haar basis. Coefficients in Level 1
and 2 reflect the starting and stopping of the heater, as ex-
plained in Section 2.4. To include small inaccuracies, we
define sCoeff1 to cover coefficients of Level 1 if their value is
in [13, 17] or [−17,−13] and Level 2 if their value is in [18, 22]
or [−22,−18]. Consequently sCoeff2 contains all values of co-
efficients on Level 1 except for [13, 17] and [−17,−13] and
Level 2 except for [18, 22] and [−22,−18]. s1 and s2 qual-
ify as a discriminative pair spair since s
Trans
1 = s
Trans
2 and
sCoeff1
⋂
sCoeff2 = ∅. In this example, the channel relevant
for spair only contains the heater consumption. 
For different transformations or for different bases the de-
termination of coefficients works in the same way, as long
as the proposed specification of coefficients holds. Using a
different transformation or basis allows to cover other re-
quirements, see Section 4.
3.2 Step 2: Perturbation
This section explains how we have ensured Pufferfish pri-
vacy in time series of smart meter data. One common
method explicitly illustrated in the following is to apply ad-
ditive Laplace noise to aggregates [20]. If different channels
are correlated, the noise should follow other distributions,
see [20]. However, this does not affect the following descrip-
tion. As explained in Section 3.1.2, a smart meter signal
is an aggregate of different appliances, but noise is only re-
quired for some channels. Identifying the channels and the
noise distribution applicable is not obvious.
3.2.1 Perturbation Mechanism for Time Series
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Figure 4: Example consumption time series of a
starting/stopping flow heater
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Figure 5: Haar Wavelet decomposition of time series
of a starting/stopping heater (only three levels)
We explain our approach for perturbing a time series of
smart meter data in the transformed representation. The
perturbation naturally must have a noise distribution. We
refer to the transformed version with mechanism sTrans and
basis sBase, where w consists of sTrans and sBase, as fw. We
refer to the resulting perturbed time series as f ′w.
Additionally to the noise distribution, the perturbation
also requires the selection of the coefficients to be noised.
This leads to the following definition.
Definition 12 (Perturbation Mechanism for a Dis-
criminative Pair): A perturbation mechanism P is a
function that takes a time series fw in abstracted represen-
tation, the noise N to be applied dependent on the privacy
parameter  and a formal definition of the coefficients to
be perturbed pcoeff . It returns the privacy-enhanced time
series in the transformed representation, referred to as f ′w.
f ′w = P(fw,N, pcoeff )

3.2.2 Noised elements
pcoeff specifies the elements of f ′w to be perturbed. Sim-
ilarly to the definition of secret descriptions, we leave aside
the language for selecting these coefficients. Examples for
pcoeff are as follows:
• All: This is the most simple strategy. Additive noise
is applied to all coefficients.
• Trigger dependent: Since coefficients in a certain
range have a defined meaning, they are perturbed.
This is similar to [26]. However, the ranges and the
noise have a well-defined meaning (c.f. Figure 2), guar-
anteeing a certain level of privacy. Note that it is now
possible to define the noise relative to fw[x].
• Time dependent: The user specifies coefficients to
be perturbed (e.g., from t1 to t2 etc.), independent of
the value. However, this only works if the transforma-
tion mechanism keeps the time location.
• Trigger and time dependent: This combines both
possibilities just mentioned.
3.2.3 Noise Distribution
P used with noise according to Pufferfish and to the dis-
criminative pair spair = (s1, s2) guarantees privacy.
Lemma 2: Let f be a time series of smart meter data,
spair = (s1, s2) the information an individual wants to hide,
CsBase a transformation mechanism suitable for spair and
P a perturbation mechanism. There exists a distribution
of noise N with P for CfsBase that satisfies the -Pufferfish
Privacy Definition.
Proof: Secrets (Definition 9) as well as discriminative
pairs (Definition 10) are defined according to the Puffer-
fish framework. Assume that data evolution scenario D
defines the distribution of values on each channel of the
whole signal, including those on the relevant channel for
spair. Since the transformation mechanism CsBase is an
endomorphism for the +-operator, the distribution D also
holds for the abstracted representation. If we apply noise N
for spair = (s1, s2) so that the following holds, -Pufferfish
privacy is guaranteed.
P (M(Data) = o|s1, d) ≤ e · P (M(Data) = o|s2, d)
P (M(Data) = o|s2, d) ≤ e · P (M(Data) = o|s1, d)
According to [20], a suitable distribution of noise can be
found for every D dependent on . 
The following example illustrates how to choose noise for
the starting flow heater appropriately.
Example 6 (Hiding the start of the heater): Bob wants
to hide the pair spair = (s1, s2) from Example 5. To do so,
we carry out the proposed wavelet transformation CWavew
with the Haar basis w. Let fr be the relevant channel for
spair. To ease presentation, suppose that the channels are
statistically independent. The coefficients in question for s1
and s2 correspond to non-overlapping intervals by definition.
For instance, let fw[x] be a value of Level 1 of the wavelet-
transformed representation. If frw[x] ∈ [y − k, y + k], s1 is
true for y = 15 with an imprecision interval of k = 2, oth-
erwise s2. For Level 2 s1 is true for y = 20 and k = 2.
In this case, we want to prevent an adversary from learn-
ing the value of frw[x] by accessing the privacy-enhanced
signal f ′w[x]. [20] shows that adding noise drawn from the
Laplace(4k/) distribution with density function 
8k
e−|x|/4k
guarantees -Pufferfish privacy for the aggregate as follows:
An adversary cannot distinguish whether the value of a sin-
gle channel is between y − k and y + k or one of the neigh-
boring intervals [y + k, y + 3k) or [y − 3k, y − k). Let X be
a random variable drawn from the above distribution and
x be the coefficient to hide. We then generate the privacy-
enhanced aggregate f ′w[x] as follows:
f ′w[x] = f
r
w[x] + f
i
w[x] + · · ·+X
Note that adding noise does not require the disaggregation
of the signal into several channels, i.e., f ′w[x] = fw[x] + X.
Adding noise already ensures Pufferfish privacy.
Since wavelet coefficients are time-located, it is possible
to add noise for weekdays between 8:00 and 10:00, cf. Ex-
ample 1. On the weekends, we add noise during the whole
day on Levels 1 and 2. 
3.3 Step 3: Inverse Transformation
The last step transforms the abstracted and perturbed
representation f ′w back to the time-based one f
′. This is
possible, since Definition 7 requires invertibility.
4. TRANSFORMATIONS
After having applied -Pufferfish Privacy on smart-meter
data, there still are issues worth to be discussed. First, we
have illustrated the hiding of switch-on/off events of a flow
heater with the help of the Haar wavelet transformation.
However, there are privacy requirements with a different
structure which this transform cannot cover. It can hide
certain other requirements, as discussed in Section 4.1. Sec-
ond, as other secrets may require different transformations,
we discuss alternatives to the Haar-wavelet transformation
in Section 4.2.
4.1 Applications of Wavelet Transformation
Non-intrusive appliance-load monitoring [15] is a collec-
tive term for a number of methods. They try to extract
information on devices by monitoring the aggregated power
consumption of several devices. Next to [15] there exist other
recent approaches [22, 21, 14, 35, 3]. The switch on and off
events that can be monitored at the power supply are impor-
tant to detect the appliances. Running appliances usually
correspond to specific activities and thus are likely to be
considered as private. Thus, it is promising to hide exactly
these events in order to protect the privacy of individuals.
The representation with the Haar basis describes the switch-
on/off events well. However, there are two limitations: First,
the Haar transformation works only for time series of length
2n since the wavelet has length 2. Second, it is not trivial
to find another basis that describes other patterns. In order
to cover other secrets, modifications of the wavelet trans-
formation or completely different transformations may be
necessary, as described in the following section.
4.2 Transformation Mechanisms
If a transformation fulfills Definition 7, we can use it to
hide discriminative pairs of secrets. It is promising to take
the transformation an adversary will use to extract informa-
tion on the discriminative pair into account. For instance,
one may take a NIALM approach [22, 21, 14, 35, 3, 15]
and deploy a transformation used there. However, not ev-
ery secret can be represented in the wavelet transformed
representation proposed. Thus, in the following we intro-
duce transformations that could be used instead of the one
presented so far. These are the Discrete Fourier Transfor-
mation, other wavelet transformations, codebooks and mul-
tiresolution analysis.
4.2.1 Decomposed Wavelet Transformation:
The Haar wavelet transformation is capable of transform-
ing a time series if its length is a multiple of 2n. In general
this is not the case, but we can decompose the signal: The
decomposed wavelet transformation splits the original signal
into different disjoint subsequences and applies the wavelet
transformation on each one. This allows independent mod-
ifications of different periods of the signal. A popular de-
composition is the Ancient Egyptian Decomposition [9].
Lemma 3: The Decomposed wavelet transformation fulfills
Definition 7.
Proof: Lemma 1 states that a wavelet transformation ful-
fills the necessary requirements. The decomposed transfor-
mation processes distinct parts of the time series and thus
it also is invertible and an endomorphism. 
4.2.2 Wavelet-Packet Transformation
The wavelet-packet transform is another wavelet transfor-
mation. In contrast to the transformation already proposed,
it does not require a specified basis such as the Haar basis.
In particular, with the help of a time series representing the
pattern of a secret the packet transform is able to compute
a suitable basis. The resulting basis is matched to the given
time series [10]. The advantage of the packet transform is
that it can be used to flexibly create wavelet bases that
match patterns well. Such a pre-computed basis is used to
transform the signal respectively the channels following the
standard wavelet transformation. While the wavelet-packet
transformation provides further flexibility, we do not use it
in our evaluation in Section 5. This is because other trans-
formations suffice to deal with the secrets featured there.
Lemma 4: The wavelet-packet transformation fulfills Defi-
nition 7.
Proof: The wavelet packet transformation chooses a cus-
tom base for the transformation, as a composition of or-
thonormal bases. Thus it is invertible. Since the transfor-
mation applies the same basis to all the channels the addi-
tion of the coefficients is well-defined and thus it also is an
endomorphism for the + operator. 
4.2.3 Discrete Fourier Transformation
Oscillations in the power consumption are periodically re-
peating power demands, e.g., appliances running at fixed
times. Oscillations also are a characteristic of the state of
appliances, e.g., the frequency of power peaks of a televi-
sion corresponds to the TV program. The discrete Fourier
transformation [27] converts a sequence of samples (this is
the time series) to a frequency-decomposed representation of
the oscillations described. Thus, this transformation allows
to hide periodical events.
Lemma 5: The DFT fulfills Definition 7.
Proof: Each coefficient in the Fourier-transformed rep-
resentation corresponds to certain well defined frequencies.
Thus, there exists an inverse transformation [33]. Further,
the value of each coefficient is the amplitude of a certain fre-
quency. A sum in the time domain of two time series equals
to the sum of all frequency amplitudes. The DFT also is an
endomorphism for +. 
4.2.4 Codebooks and Multiresolution Analysis
Individuals might have a certain pattern in mind that they
want to hide and then use a multiresolution-codebook rep-
resentation such as [32] to search for this pattern. In a nut-
shell, a codebook is a map from keys to patterns (sequences
of power-consumption values). The abstracted time series is
represented by a sequence of these keys, and each value cor-
responds to the pattern described by codewords in the code-
book. In general, there may be a small difference between
the codewords and the actual patterns. Usually, these dif-
ferences are neglected [32], leading to an inaccurate inverse.
Invertibility requires recording these differences. Patterns
can also be created by compression algorithms [34, 8] such
as LZW that extract similar sequences. Whether such trans-
formations fulfill the requirements of Definition 7 depends
on the actual algorithm. A codebook is invertible since it is
a unique map. It also is an endomorphism for + if the ad-
dition of two keys results in a key representing the addition
of the patterns in the time domain.
5. EVALUATION
Our evaluation has two goals, generality and utility: First,
an individual should be able to hide arbitrary information.
Second, the disclosed data should still be useful while guar-
anteeing privacy to the extent specified.
Regarding the first issue, to evaluate objectively whether
our approach is general enough to cover a broad range of pri-
vacy requirements we need a reliable source of such require-
ments. To our knowledge, such a source for smart meter
data does not exist. However, there exist recent approaches
extracting various kinds of information on individuals from
smart meter data. The information these approaches try to
extract can be perceived as information that is worth to be
protected, i.e., as privacy requirements. We show that it is
possible to define discriminative pairs of secrets suitable for
these requirements. The approaches explicitly considered
in what follows are a non-intrusive appliance-load monitor-
ing approach (NIALM, Section 5.1) and a re-identification
approach (Section 5.2). All in all, we have identified over
thirteen categories of secrets. We will show that guaran-
teeing Pufferfish privacy makes information extraction with
those methods much more difficult.
We now preview the second issue of quantifying utility.
Abstract time-series-distance measures do not allow for mean-
ingful conclusions regarding the utility of a modified time se-
ries for applications. See Example 4. To ensure realistic con-
ditions, we evaluate the utility of a noised, privacy-enhanced
data set by means of a local electricity market (Section 5.3).
The approach presented hides user-defined preferences in
a time series of smart-meter data. A comparison of our
approach with another one regarding utility would only be
conclusive if the reference point offered the same extent of
privacy; but we are not aware of any such approach.
5.1 Generality: The INDiC NIALM Approach
As a first step of evaluating generality, we assume that
individuals want to hide whether a specific appliance is run-
ning or not. NIALM approaches allow the extraction of
running appliances from the aggregated smart meter sig-
nal. While the different NIALM methods are numerous,
we choose INDiC [4], a refinement of one of the first meth-
ods [15]. Compared to other approaches, it is simple but
detects appliances accurately. INDiC assumes that each ap-
pliance has a number of states with different extents of power
consumption, and an appliance can only be in one state at
a time. In this case, disaggregation is a combinatorial opti-
mization problem, namely finding the optimal combination
of appliances in different states while minimizing the error.
Evaluating how well secrets hinder information extraction
outlet/appliance State 1 State 2 State 3
dishwasher 0W 260W 1195W
kitchen 5W 727W
kitchen2 1W 204W 1036W
light 9W 113W 156W
microwave 9W 822W 1740W
refrigerator 7W 214W 423W
stove 0W 373W
Table 1: States of appliances
with INDiC requires a ground truth. It contains whether
INDiC is successful when extracting information on run-
ning devices. Thus, the creation of the ground truth re-
quires the smart meter signal as well as individual channels
of devices to compute success rates. We use the REDD
dataset [22], which contains the total power consumption of
different households consisting of the two ‘main’ power sig-
nals (smart meter) and a number of isolated channels (elec-
tricity outlets) monitored in parallel. The disaggregation
together with the subsequent evaluation consists of the fol-
lowing steps:
1. The data set (including both main and appliance chan-
nels) is divided into a training and a test set.
2. For each appliance channel available, INDiC deter-
mines possible different states by clustering the power-
consumption values of the training set.
3. Based on the states identified, the main channels in
the test-data set are disaggregated.
4. To evaluate the success of the disaggregation, the re-
sults computed are compared to the actual appliance-
usage data available from the other channels.
5.1.1 Application of the Pufferfish Framework
For the definition of secrets descriptions, we require knowl-
edge of devices: Table 1 shows the results of the training. As
a result of the training, INDiC comes up with different states
of each appliance by finding frequent power-consumption
levels. Each level corresponds to a state, and the num-
ber of states may vary contingent on the appliance. The
states with the corresponding power level are the external
knowledge of an adversary trying to gather information by
inspecting the aggregated power -onsumption time series f .
INDiC determines running appliances by accounting the to-
tal power consumption to states.
W.l.o.g., we assume that the household wants to hide
if the light is in State 2 or State 3. Choosing another
pair only requires to use other power-consumption levels
in the secret. Thus, the description of the secrets is s1 =
‘Light is in State 2’ and s2 = ‘Light is in State 3’. INDiC
works without modifying the representation of the time se-
ries. Hence, we modify the time series as is: sTrans1 =
sTrans2 = id, and the base is s
Base
1 = s
Base
2 = T . Ac-
cording to Table 1, light is in State 2 if 113W is not ac-
counted to another appliance and in State 3 if 156W is not
accounted elsewhere. sCoeff1 contains coefficients that re-
sult in 113W , and sCoeff2 contains coefficients that result in
156W unaccounted power. Then the discriminative pair is
spair = (s1, s2). INDiC assumes that all appliances have the
same probability to be in a specific state, i.e., we can assume
that D is evenly distributed when adding noise. Since the se-
Figure 6: Confusion Matrix for the INDiC approach
(without noise)
State 1 State 2 State 3
State 1 0.94 0.04 0.02
State 2 0.16 0.60 0.24
State 3 0.48 0.06 0.46
Table 2: Tabular representation of INDiC on data
without noise, Predicted states vs. True states
crets considered do not specify a time span, we set pcoeff to
f . To sum up, an adversary should be unable to distinguish
whether the unaccounted power is around 113W or 156W .
According to Section 3.2.1, we choose Laplace(4× 156−113
2
/)
noise to perturb the interval between both values. Further,
we assume that the household wants to achieve -Pufferfish
privacy with  = 0.1.
5.1.2 Results
In order to quantify the error due the noise we conducted
an INDiC disaggregation on the test-data set with and with-
out noise applied. We determine the loss of accuracy as well
as the change in uncertainty whether light is in State 2 or
State 3. The result is that INDiC guesses the state right
for most points of time (Table 2). The rows represent the
predicted state of the appliance and the columns the actual
state determined as ground truth. Thus, the element at
m× n represents the relative frequency that the m-th state
was detected while the state has actually been n. After
applying noise, the results get worse (Table 3): Since spair
should hide the distinction between State 2 and 3, we are in-
terested in results covering the probabilities of both. An ad-
versary obviously has difficulties distinguishing which state
is true: Guessing the right state is only 4% more likely than
guessing the other one (see Table 3). The accuracy drops by
40% regarding State 2 and 23% regarding State 3. This is
a massive drop because of our assumption that each state is
equally possible. The so-called confusion matrix summarizes
the evaluation and provides further insight into the results.
It displays the relationship between the states guessed and
the actual ones. The rows represent the predicted state of
the appliance, and the columns the actual state determined
as ground truth. Thus, the element at m × n represents,
how often the m-th state was detected while the state actu-
ally was n. Figure 5.1.2 shows the matrix without applying
Pufferfish and Figure 5.1.2 with privacy protection.
5.1.3 Limitations
Figure 7: Confusion Matrix for the INDiC approach
(with noise)
State 1 State 2 State 3
State 1 0.64 0.16 0.20
State 2 0.64 0.20 0.16
State 3 0.58 0.19 0.23
Table 3: Tabular representation INDiC on data with
noise, Predicted states vs. True states
The definition of arbitrary secrets covering other appli-
ances is similar to the case in Section 5.1.1. However, adding
Laplace noise with a higher deviation may lead to negative
power-consumption values. This obviously is not valid. Re-
placing negative values with valid ones, e.g., zero, changes
the distribution of the noise and thus does not qualify as
Pufferfish privacy. One may not be able to guarantee pri-
vacy when large differences between states shall be hidden.
However, this is not specific to Pufferfish or to this current
study. It rather is a general problem of information-hiding
approaches: Perturbing information that is a significant part
of an aggregated value requires noise with a large variance.
5.2 Generality: Re-Identification
Re-Identification means linking personal data which does
not contain any direct identifiers (name, address, etc.) to
individuals. Features of the consumption help to re-identify
time series of power-consumption values [6]. To illustrate,
we focus on the following four features: sum, maximum and
minimum of the power consumption for a time interval and
average bedtime hour, i.e., the first point of time in the
evening when the consumption decreases significantly. Note
that we also can hide all other features listed in [6]. Ta-
ble 4 lists the necessary transformations and the relevant
coefficients. Those four features have the same structure as
almost half of the features in Table 4.
We now review how re-identification works:
1. The adversary has feature values of households as ex-
ternal knowledge, e.g., a certain household usually goes
to bed at 11pm.
2. For each time series in question, the values for these
features are computed. The adversary compares the
results with the external knowledge.
3. Assuming that households tend to have repeating be-
havior over time, features computed for a household
for different time periods tend to have similar values.
The system computes a score based on the difference
between feature values that are part of the external
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Features Transformation Coefficients concerned
Sum Haar-Wavelet Scaling Coefficient
Maximum Haar-Wavelet Scaling Coefficient
Minimum Haar-Wavelet Scaling Coefficient
Evening Sum Decomposed Wavelet Relevant Scaling Coeff.
Morning Sum Decomposed Wavelet Relevant Scaling Coeff.
0.9 Quantile Fourier All
Standard Deviation Fourier All
Frequency of mode Fourier Significant Frequencies
Fraction of Weekend Fourier Frequencies reflecting
Consumption fraction
Wakeup time Haar-Wavelet Level 1/2
Bedtime Haar-Wavelet Level 1/2
Table 4: Feasible Transformation for re-identification features
knowledge and the values of the household in question.
The smaller the score, the more likely the household is
the sought one.
4. A household is deemed re-identified if its time series
receives the n-th lowest score or lower. n is an external
parameter and allows to overcome imprecision.
An earlier result is that up to 82.8% of the households can
be re-identified [6] in an unmodified data set. To hinder re-
identification, certain distinctive features need to be hidden.
For the four secrets explicitly considered here, the wavelet
transform with a Haar basis is suitable: The scaling coeffi-
cient (see Section 2.4) represents the sum and also influences
the maximum and minimum, see Section 5.2.1. Levels 1 and
2 reflect the first significant decrease for the bedtime hour,
like the heater starting or stopping.
5.2.1 Hiding Sum, Maximum and Minimum
Next, we say how the sum, the maximum and the min-
imum can be hidden. To do so, we take a closer look at
re-identification. The total power consumption of a time
period is the sum of all channels i ∈ [1 . . . n]:∑
∀t∈T
f [t] =
∑
∀t∈T
f1[t] + · · ·+
∑
∀t∈T
fn[t]
An adversary with external knowledge on the power con-
sumption trying to re-identify a record has to take inaccura-
cies into account, i.e., he typically does not know the total
consumption for sure, only within a certain range. Thus, we
partition the channels into a known one, such as the rele-
vant channel r, and the ones not known. The channels not
known are responsible for the difference between the known
channels and the total consumption at each point of time.∑
∀t∈T
f [t] =
∑
∀t∈T
f1[t] + · · ·+
∑
∀t∈T
fr[t] + · · ·+
∑
∀t∈T
fn[t]
Based on the sum
∑
∀t∈T f [t] the adversary has to decide
whether the known channel is consistent with his knowledge.
Adding Laplace noise in line with -Pufferfish privacy leads
to uncertainty regarding
∑
∀t∈T f
r[t]. Re-identification is
successful if an adversary is able to single out the true in-
dividual record. In particular, this is relatively easy if the
feature values of individuals are spread over a wide range and
are rather unique. Thus, individual privacy requirements de-
pend on assumptions regarding other individuals in the data
set. Describing a suitable secret is deciding which interval is
sufficient to hide
∑
∀t∈T f
r[t] amongst other channels. We
use the following notation:
sk = ‘Known power consumption is in interval [y-k, y+k]’
The discriminative pairs can be of the form spair = (sk, s3k).
One way to determine k is to look at the distribution of a
known data set. Figure 8 indicates that k = 5kWh is suffi-
cient to hide a single household amongst more than 10 others
for a large number of households. These considerations also
hold for the features ‘Minimum’ and ‘Maximum’.
Applying noise to the scaling coefficient Applying
noise to the scaling coefficient is special, compared to other
coefficients. In particular, the scaling coefficient is normed.
It represents the sum, minimum and maximum, and is cal-
culated as follows:
∑
∀t∈T f [t]√
‖T ‖ . Thus, the additive noise
Laplace(4k/) is normed as well:
∑
∀t∈T f [t]√
‖T ‖ +
Laplace(4k/)√
‖T ‖ .
5.2.2 Hiding Bed-Time and Wakeup-Time Hours
According to [6], the bedtime hour is when a household
switches off certain devices, e.g., the television, right before
going to bed. This do not have to be the same devices for
different households as long as they are usually switched off
right before going to bed. We consider switch-off events only
between 4pm and 2am. Some appliances may still run, but
only the change of consumption is of interest. An adversary
trying to re-identify a household is interested in deciding
whether the devices are switched off or not. Thus, an indi-
vidual wants to hide the discriminative pair spair consisting
of the following secrets: s1 = ‘Household switches off de-
vices before bedtime’ and s2 = ‘Household does not switch
off devices before bedtime’. The relevant channel r includes
the devices mentioned for spair.
fw[x] = f
r
w[x] + f
1
w[x] + · · ·+ fnw[x]
The switch-off causes a decrease of the power consumption
of 0.5kWh on f
spair
w [x]. Thus, we apply Laplace((4×0.5)/)
noise on Level 1 and Laplace((4 × 0.5√
2
)/) noise on Level 2
during 4pm and 2am. Hiding wakeup times is similar.
5.2.3 Results
It is possible to hide all other features for re-identification [6];
Table 4 lists the necessary transformations.
To quantify effectiveness, we look at the relative decrease
in accuracy, i.e., the number of households re-identified with
and without applying noise. While re-identification makes
use of a combination of features, to isolate the effects of
hiding specific secrets we only look at features relevant for
the secret. While this reduces the number of households
re-identified, this is the case both with and without apply-
ing noise, so our evaluation is still conclusive. We deem
a household re-identified if its time series receives the n-
th lowest score at least. In total, we tested 158 house-
hold from the CER data set and set  = 0.1. This data
set consists of roughly 5000 homes in Ireland with different
numbers of inhabitants, measuring electricity consumption
every 30 minutes over more than one year [16]. Table 5
contains our results. It contains the feature set used for re-
identification and the accuracy decrease after applying the
Pufferfish framework. First, independent of the feature set,
there is a significant decrease in accuracy. Thus, hiding the
features in the described way is effective. However, the al-
gorithm still can re-identify a small number of households:
In our evaluation, we have assumed the same discriminative
pair for all households. However, for outliers in particular,
e.g., a household consuming a lot of electricity and thus be-
ing easy to re-identify, discriminative pairs should differ. In
particular, the k of the interval must be larger. If the fea-
ture value of a number of households is similar, then the re-
identification algorithm starts to guess. Random ‘correct’
guesses become more with n = 5. Still, Pufferfish allows
the definition of suitable secrets to hinder re-identification.
Even with secrets designed in a straightforward way without
considering outliers the accuracy decreases significantly.
5.3 Utility: Welfare of a Local Energy Market
A privacy method must protect sensitive information of
individuals. However, it is also important that the data can
still be used for certain purposes afterwards. In order to
evaluate to which extent the proposed mechanism preserves
utility, we integrate it into a local energy-market scenario
and measure the effect on the welfare. Welfare is a well-
known and intuitively understandable economic measure. In
a local energy market, consumers and producers can trade
electricity. In general, this leads to a more effective alloca-
tion of renewables, including a drop of CO2 emissions. How-
ever, individuals have to reveal their prospective consump-
tion to other market participants. Obviously, the prospec-
tive consumption tends to be similar or even identical to
the actual one. With any reasonable market mechanism, if
participants reveal their true demand they will receive the
highest welfare. In turn, revealing a privacy-enhanced de-
mand induces a loss of welfare. However, protecting privacy
has a value for the individuals as well. Thus it is insightful
to investigate this tradeoff. This method has already been
tested in another similar context, see [7] for more details.
5.3.1 Results
For our evaluation, we have studied a town with 300 per-
sons living in households of up to five persons. The time
interval examined is five days. The consumption data has
come from the CER data source [16]. As renewable sources
we have taken 150 photovoltaic sites as well as 150 com-
bined heat and power plants. As privacy requirements, we
have chosen to hide the bedtime and the total sum see. Since
Pufferfish as well as the selection of households include ran-
domness, we repeat each experiment ten times. We measure
the relative welfare, which is the welfare using the privacy
method in relation to the welfare for the original data.
Hiding the bedtime results in a welfare loss of 26% on
average, with a low spread, see Figure 9. Hiding requires
applying noise to 10 hours a day. This includes the con-
sumption after 4pm, which contains a large fraction of the
daily consumption due to evening activities of households.
Hiding the sum respectively the minimum and maximum
consumption leads to a smaller relative welfare loss com-
pared to the bedtime requirement on average, but has a
larger spread of values. In this case, applying noise shifts
all the values of the time series up- or downwards, but it
keeps the shape. This is because the actual development is
not influenced. Thus, we see that hiding different secrets
has different effects on the utility (Figure 9). Note that the
welfare loss of 26% is relative to the theoretical maximum
efficiency (cf. [7]). Thus, the loss of welfare is relatively low,
compared to the fraction of values modified.
5.4 Summary of Results
The evaluation has shown that Pufferfish privacy can in-
deed shield personal information from information-extraction
approaches. The potential of an adversary to gain informa-
tion from the disclosed data set has dropped significantly.
On the other hand, we have shown by means of a local en-
ergy market that the utility of the resulting data set still is on
an acceptable level. Again, we have used secrets that pre-
vent state-of-the-art information-extraction methods from
providing meaningful results.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Disclosure of data plays a significant role in the context
of the smart grid. However, time series of smart meter data
contain sensitive information, represented in many different
ways. Individuals might not allow access to the data as long
as sensitive information based on individual privacy pref-
erences is not removed. Pufferfish is a state-of-the-art ap-
proach to hide specific information. However, application-
specific work is required when applying it to smart meter
data and carrying out an evaluation that is conclusive. This
includes the definition of how sensitive information is repre-
sented, how data-evolution scenarios can be applied, and
how the information can be perturbed to give Pufferfish
guarantees. Next, it is challenging to evaluate the general
coverage of secrets and the utility of the perturbed data.
Our study has addressed these points.
Our study has featured a general way of describing secrets
in smart-meter data. Transforming time series of such data
is one possible way to facilitate the definition of arbitrary
secrets. A certain set of transformations is sufficient to cover
a broad variety of possible secrets. The precision of modern
information-extraction methods then decreases significantly,
which is good. On the other hand the impact on the utility
of the data, measured in a real-world scenario, is tolerable.
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